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Abstract—We examine for the first time the impact of
transmitter-side correlation on the secure transmission with
artificial noise (AN), based on which a new power allocation
strategy for AN is devised for physical layer security enhance-
ment. Specifically, we design a correlation-based power allocation
(CPA) for AN, of which the optimality in terms of achieving the
minimum secrecy outage probability is analytically proved in
the large system regime with the number of transmit antennas
approaching infinity. Our numerical results demonstrate that
the CPA is nearly optimal and can significantly outperform the
widely-used uniform power allocation (UPA) even for a moderate
(finite) number of correlated transmit antennas. Our numerical
results also reveal a fundamental difference between the secrecy
performance of the CPA and that of the UPA. When the number
of correlated transmit antennas increases, we find that the secrecy
outage probability of the CPA always reduces while the secrecy
outage probability of the UPA suffers from a saturation point.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
As wireless devices are becoming increasingly ubiquitous,
crucial concerns on the security of wireless communication
are emerging since a large amount of confidential information
is conveyed by the open medium. Besides the traditional
cryptographic techniques, physical layer security has recently
become another key mechanism for safeguarding wireless
communications and thus attracted a high level of research
interest due to its two noticeable advantages [1–3]. First,
physical layer security can guarantee information secrecy re-
gardless of an eavesdropper’s computational capability, which
leads to the fact that perfect secrecy can be achieved on the
physical layer only. Second, physical layer security eliminates
the centralized key distribution and management requested
by cryptographic techniques, thus facilitating the management
and improving the efficiency of wireless communications. In
pioneering studies, e.g., [4, 5], a wiretap channel was proposed
as the fundamental model of physical layer security, in which
an eavesdropper (Eve) wiretaps the wireless communication
from a transmitter (Alice) to an intended receiver (Bob).
Motivated by multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) tech-
niques, physical layer security in MIMO wiretap channels has
attracted considerable research interest in the past decade (e.g.,
[6–8]). In this context, an increasing amount of research effort
has been devoted to the secure transmission with artificial
noise (AN) due to its robustness and desirable performance
(e.g., [9–15]). The utilization of AN to enhance physical
layer security was proposed in [9], where AN is isotropically
transmitted in the null space of the main channel (i.e., the
channel between Alice and Bob) in order to possibly reduce
the quality of the eavesdropper’s channel (i.e., the channel
between Alice and Eve) without causing interference to Bob.
Following [9] the secure transmission with AN has been
well investigated in uncorrelated fading channels. However,
it is often in practical scenarios that correlation exists among
multiple antennas at one transceiver due to limited separation
between antenna elements or poor scattering conditions. To the
best knowledge of the authors, in the context of physical layer
security the study on antenna correlation is still in its infancy.
The impact of receiver-side correlation at Bob and Eve on
the system performance was examined in [16] and [17], while
the impact of the transmitter-side correlation has never been
examined in the literature. This leaves an important gap in our
understanding on the performance of the secure transmission
with AN, and closing this gap forms the core of this work.
B. Our Contributions
In this work, we first detail the secure transmission with AN
in wiretap channels with transmitter-side correlation, based on
which we determine the optimal power allocation (OPA) for
AN that minimizes the secrecy outage probability as an (Nt−
1)-dimensional numerical search problem (where Nt is the
number of antennas at Alice). Then, focusing on the large
system regime with Nt →∞ we derive a closed-form solution
to the optimal power allocation, named the correlation-based
power allocation (CPA), in which Alice allocates all the AN
power to one specific direction determined by the transmitter-
side correlation matrix and the channel state information (CSI)
of the main channel. We further analytically prove that the
CPA maximizes the average interference power to Eve for
arbitrary number of correlated transmit antennas. In addition,
based on the conducted analysis we draw useful insights on the
comparison between the proposed CPA and the widely-used
uniform power allocation (UPA), in which AN is isotropically
transmitted in the null space of the main channel [9–15].
We present numerical results to characterize the secrecy
performance of the CPA with UPA as the benchmark. Our
results first demonstrate that a moderate level of antenna
correlation already allows the CPA to achieve the nearly
optimal secrecy performance even with a small number of
transmit antennas. In such a situation, the CPA significantly
Fig. 1. Illustration of the wiretap channel of interest where Alice is equipped
with Nt correlated antennas.
outperforms the UPA. Our results also reveal a fundamental
difference between the CPA and UPA. That is when the
number of correlated transmit antennas (i.e., Nt) increases,
the secrecy outage probability achieved by the CPA always
decreases, while the secrecy outage probability achieved by
the UPA suffers from a saturation point.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Channel Model
The wiretap channel of interest is illustrated in Fig. 1, where
Alice is equipped with Nt antennas, Bob is equipped with a
single antenna, and Eve is equipped with a single antenna. We
assume that all the wireless channels within our system model
are subject to quasi-static Rayleigh fading, and the average
fading power is normalized to one. Specifically, we adopt the
separable correlation model and thus the 1×Nt main channel
(i.e., the channel between Alice and Bob) vector is given by
h = hsT
1/2, (1)
where hs ∈ C1×Nt has independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian entries (i.e.,
the entries are i.i.d circularly symmetric complex Gaussian
random variables with zero-mean and unit-variance), T is
the transmitter-side correlation matrix, and T1/2 denotes the
cholesky square root of T. Without loss of generality, we as-
sume that T is a positive symmetric matrix. Thus, its singular
value decomposition (SVD) can be written as T = UTΛU
†
T ,
where UT is a unitary matrix and Λ = diag[λ1, · · · , λNt ]
is the diagonal matrix with λi as the i-th singular value of
T. Then, we can rewrite (1) as h = hs
√
ΛU
†
T , where each
element of
√
Λ is the square root of the corresponding element
of Λ. In this work, we assume h is perfectly known at all
transceivers.
The eavesdropper’s channel is subject to the same
transmitter-side correlation as the main channel and thus the
1×Nt eavesdropper’s channel vector is given by
g = gsT
1/2 = gs
√
ΛU
†
T , (2)
where gs ∈ C1×Nt has i.i.d circularly-symmetric complex
Gaussian entries. We consider a passive eavesdropping sce-
nario, where Alice does not know g, but knows T due to the
fact that T is determined by Alice’s antenna geometry.
B. Secure Transmission with Artificial Noise
We next detail the secure transmission with AN in the
wiretap channel of interest. In this secure transmission scheme,
Alice transmits an information signal sI in conjunction with an
(Nt − 1)× 1 AN signal vector sN [9–15], where sI and each
entry of sN have unit variance. We denote the total transmit
power of Alice by PA. The fraction of the power allocated to
sI is α (0 < α ≤ 1), and the remaining power (1 − α)PA is
allocated to sN . In order to transmit sI and sN , Alice designs
an Nt ×Nt beamforming matrix V given by
V = [vI VN ] , (3)
where vI ∈ CNt×1 is used to transmit sI and VN ∈
CNt×(Nt−1) is used to transmit sN . The aim of vI is to
maximize the instantaneous SNR of the main channel, and
thus we have vI =
h
†
∥h∥ . Meanwhile, VN is to degrade the
quality of the eavesdropper’s channel by transmitting sN while
perfectly avoiding interference to Bob. As such, VN consists
of Nt − 1 orthonomal column vectors in the nullspace of h†.
Then, the Nt×1 transmitted signal vector at Alice, x, is given
by
x = [vI VN ]
[ √
αPA, 0
0,
√
(1−α)PA
Nt−1
√
Ω
] [
sI
sN
]
=
√
αPAvIsI +
√
(1− α)PA
Nt − 1 VN
√
ΩsN , (4)
where Ω ∈ C(Nt−1)×(Nt−1) is the power allocation matrix for
sN satisfying tr(Ω) = Nt − 1.
Following (4) and noting hVN = 0, the received signal at
Bob is given by
y = hx+ nB =
√
αPAhvIsI + nB , (5)
where nB is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at Bob
satisfying E
[
nBn
†
B
]
= σ2B . Based on (5), the instantaneous
SNR at Bob is given by
γB = αγB ∥h∥2 = αγB
Nt∑
i=1
λi|hs(i)|2, (6)
where γB = PA/σ
2
B . We note that γB is a function of Λ but
not a function of UT .
Following (4), the received signal at Eve is given by
z = gx+ nE
=
√
αPAgvIsI +
√
(1− α)PA
Nt − 1 gVN
√
ΩsN + nE , (7)
where nE is the AWGN at Eve satisfying E
[
nEn
†
E
]
= σ2E .
It is crucial to clarify that although Eve knows h and V,
she cannot eliminate the interference caused by VNsN due
to Nt > 1. Following (7), the instantaneous SINR at Eve is
given by
γE = αgvI
(
1− α
Nt − 1gVNΩV
†
Ng
† +
1
γE
)−1
v
†
Ig
†, (8)
where γE = PA/σ
2
E . We note that γE is a function of Λ
but not of UT (the proof is similar to that of Lemma 2 in
[18] and omitted here). Noting γB is a function of Λ but
not of UT as well, we can conclude that only the singular
values of the correlation matrix T have impact on the secure
communication with AN, while the eigenvectors of T (i.e.,
UT ) have no impact.
C. Secrecy Performance Metric
An important assumption in this work is that the instanta-
neous CSI of the main channel is available at Alice. As such,
the capacity of the main channel, CB = log2(1 + γB), is
known by Alice. On the other hand, Alice does not know the
capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel, CE = log2(1 + γE),
due to the fact that she cannot access the instantaneous CSI of
the eavesdropper’s channel. Therefore, we adopt the secrecy
outage probability as our key performance metric, which is
defined as the probability that the target rate of a secure
transmission is larger than the secrecy capacity. The secrecy
outage probability is given by [19]
Pso(Rs) = Pr(Cs<Rs) = Pr(CB −Rs<CE), (9)
where Rs is the target rate of a secure transmission and Cs =
[CB − CE ]+ is the secrecy capacity, where [x]+ = max{0, x}.
In order to facilitate the secure transmission design under a
given main channel condition, we study the secrecy outage
probability in (9) for a given CB , and this outage is solely
caused by the uncertainty of CE . We also note that if Rs ≥ CB
the main channel cannot support such a secure transmission
(i.e., the secrecy outage probability is one).
III. POWER ALLOCATION FOR ARTIFICIAL NOISE
In this section, we first present the OPA for AN in the secure
transmission that minimizes the secrecy outage probability in
the wiretap channel with transmitter-side correlation. Then,
focusing on the large system regime with Nt → ∞, we
derive a closed-form solution to the optimal power allocation
based on the correlation matrix, named CPA. In addition, we
discuss the UPA in the wiretap channel with transmitter-side
correlation as a benchmark in this section.
A. Optimal Power Allocation
Utilizing the secrecy outage probability as the objective
function, the optimization problem of power allocation for AN
can be written as
min
Ω
Pso(Rs), s.t. tr(Ω) = Nt − 1. (10)
The optimization problem presented in (10) involves the
determination of (Nt − 1)2 complex entries of the power
allocation matrix Ω (i.e., 2(Nt − 1)2 real numbers), which is
of high complexity. We have the following lemma to simplify
(10) as a (Nt−1)-dimensional numerical search problem. For
the sake of clear presentation, we define a positive definite
Hermitian matrix as
Q = V†NTVN , (11)
and its SVD can be written as
Q =WΘW†, (12)
where W is a unitary matrix and Θ = diag[θ1, . . . , θNt−1] is
the diagonal matrix with θm as the m-th singular value of Q
with θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ · · · ≥ θNt−1. We now present Lemma 1 based
on the SVD of Q.
Lemma 1: The optimization problem presented in (10) can
be simplified as
min
Φ
Pso(Rs),
s.t. Ω =WΦ, tr(Φ) = Nt − 1,
Φ = diag [φ1, φ2, . . . , φNt−1] ,
(13)
where φ1, φ2, . . . , φNt−1 are non-negative real numbers.
Proof: We note that the selection of Ω affects Pso(Rs)
only through gVNΩV
†
Ng
† involved in γE given in (8).
Based on the definition of g given in (2), we have V
†
Ng
† ∼
CN (0,Q). Then we know that gVNW has i.i.d circularly-
symmetric complex Gaussian entries. As proved in [20],
gVNWΦW
†V
†
Ng
† is equal in distribution to gVNΩV
†
Ng
†
for general Φ and Ω. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
We note that the optimization problem presented in (13) is
much less complex than that provided in (10). This is due
to the fact that in (10) there are 2(Nt − 1)2 real numbers to
determine for Ω while we only have to determine Nt− 1 real
numbers for Φ in (13). We also note that analytical solution
to (13) is still mathematically intractable. This is mainly due
to the fact that Pso(Rs) cannot be derived in a closed-form
expression for a general Φ. The difficulty lies in the fact
that in the expression of γE given in (8) gVNWΦW
†V
†
Ng
†
and |gvI |2 are correlated, which leads to that the probability
density function (pdf) of γE is mathematically intractable.
Therefore, the optimization problem given in (13) can only
be solved through numerical simulations, which is of high
complexity and time-consuming for large Nt. As such, in the
following we develop a sub-optimal but much simpler power
allocation, and analytically prove its optimality in the large
system regime with Nt →∞.
B. Correlation-Based Power Allocation
Now, we propose the CPA, which is optimal in terms of
minimizing Pso(Rs) in the large system regime withNt →∞,
in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: As Nt → ∞, the optimal solution to Ω that
minimizes Pso(Rs) is given by
Ω∗ = (Nt − 1)wI , (14)
where wI is the principal eigenvector corresponding to the
largest singular value of Q (i.e., Ω∗ = WΦ∗ and Φ∗ =
diag [Nt − 1, 0, . . . , 0]).
Proof: Due to the distance concentration phenomenon
[21], when Nt → ∞ both |gvI |2 and ∥gVNW
√
Φ∥2
involved in γE approach their mean values. As such, γE
approaches its mean and its variance approaches zero as Nt →
∞. It follows that the minimization of the secrecy outage prob-
ability Pso(Rs) is equivalent to minimizing the mean of γE .
We note that Φ only varies the value of ∥gVNW
√
Φ∥2 (i.e.,
|gvI |2 is not a function of Φ). Therefore, Φ is to maximize
the mean of ∥gVNW
√
Φ∥2 in order to minimize Pso(Rs)
as per the expression of γE given in (8). As mentioned in the
proof of Lemma 1, gVNW has i.i.d entries, and thus we have
∥gVNW
√
Φ∥2 =
Nt−1∑
m=1
φmθm|gI(m)|2, (15)
where gI = gVNW
(√
Θ
)−1
has i.i.d circularly-symmetric
complex Gaussian entries with unit variance. Then, the mean
of ∥gVNW
√
Φ∥2 is given by
E
[
∥gVNW
√
Φ∥2
]
=
Nt−1∑
m=1
φmθm. (16)
Noting θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ · · · ≥ θNt−1, in order to maximize
E[∥gVNW
√
Ω∥2] subject to tr(Φ) = Nt− 1 (i.e., φ1+φ2+
· · ·+φNt−1 = Nt−1), we have to set φ∗1 = Nt−1 and φ∗k = 0
for k = 2, 3, . . . , Nt − 1 (i.e., Φ∗ = diag [Nt − 1, 0, . . . , 0]).
We note that for Φ∗ = diag [Nt − 1, 0, . . . , 0] we have
Ω∗ = WΦ∗ = (Nt− 1)wI . This completes the proof of
Theorem 1.
We note that the CPA allocates all the AN power to the
direction corresponding to the largest singular value of Q,
which is similar to the beamforming strategy based on Q. The
intuitive meaning of the CPA is that Alice first maps the Nt-
dimensional eavesdropper’s channel vector into the (Nt − 1)-
dimensional nullspace of the main channel by applying VN
and then transmits AN along the average strongest direction
of the effective eavesdropper’s channel vector gVN . This is
due to the fact that Q = V†NTVN is the covariance matrix
of gVN and thus wI corresponds to the average strongest
direction of gVN .
The following corollary states another important property
of the CPA.
Corollary 1: The CPA (i.e., Ω∗ = (Nt−1)wI ) achieves the
maximum average interference to Eve for all values of Nt,
which is given by
E
[
|gVN
√
Ω∗|2
]
= (Nt − 1)θ1. (17)
Proof: Based on Lemma 1, we know that
E
[
∥gVN
√
Ω∥2
]
= E
[
∥gVNW
√
Φ∥2
]
. Then, based
on the discussion after (16) in the proof of Theorem 1 we can
conclude that the CPA maximizes the average interference to
Eve (i.e., maximizes E
[
∥gVN
√
Ω∥2
]
). Finally, substituting
Ω∗ = WΦ∗ = (Nt−1)wI into (16) we achieve the result
given in (17).
As per Theorem 1, the instantaneous SINR at Eve of the
CPA for a given α is given by
γcE =
αγE |gvI |2
(1− α)γE |gVNwI |2 + 1
. (18)
C. Uniform Power Allocation
In this subsection, we present the UPA as a benchmark to
clarify the benefits of our proposed CPA. In the UPA, Alice
isotropically allocates the transmit power for the AN among
all entries of sN , i.e., Ω = INt−1. Following (8), the SINR at
Eve of the UPA for a given α is given by [14]
γuE =
αγE |gvI |2
(1−α)γE
Nt−1
∥gVN∥2 + 1
. (19)
Following a similar procedure for obtaining (15), we have
∥gVN∥2 =
Nt−1∑
m=1
θm|gI(m)|2. (20)
Then, the average interference to Eve achieved by the UPA is
given by
E
[∥gVN∥2] = Nt−1∑
m=1
θm. (21)
We note that the UPA is widely adopted in the literature
in wiretap channels without correlation. This is due to the
fact that Alice cannot access the instantaneous CSI of the
eavesdropper’s channel and has no information on g other
than its distribution. With regard to the comparison between
the UPA and CPA, we have the following remarks.
• The UPA maximizes the average interference to
Eve in wiretap channels without correlation (i.e.,
E
[∥gVN∥2] ≥ E [gVNΩV†Ng†] when T = INt ). We
note that our proposed CPA achieves the same average
interference to Eve as the UPA when T = INt (i.e.,
(Nt − 1)θ1 =
∑Nt−1
m=1 θm when T = INt due to
θ1 = θ2 = · · · = θNt−1 for T = INt ).
• Comparing (17) and (21) we can see that the CPA leads
to a larger average interference to Eve than the UPA in
wiretap channels with transmitter-side correlation. This is
due to θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ · · · ≥ θNt−1, which leads to (Nt −
1)θ1 ≥
∑Nt−1
m=1 θm.
• Following the proof of Theorem 1, we know that asNt →
∞ these average interferences to Eve of the CPA and
UPA as given in (17) and (21), respectively, determine
the secrecy outage probabilities of the CPA and UPA,
respectively. As such, we can conclude that in the large
system regime with Nt → ∞ the CPA leads to a lower
Pso(Rs) relative to the UPA in wiretap channels with
transmitter-side correlation.
• The gap between θ1 and
1
Nt−1
∑Nt−1
m=1 θm increases as the
correlation becomes more severe. As such, our proposed
CPA is more desirable in wiretap channels with high
transmitter-side correlation.
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Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probabilities of the OPA, CPA, and UPA ver-
sus different values of α for Nt = 4, Rs = 2, γB = 5 dB,
Λ = diag[2.8, 0.7, 0.3, 0.2], and hs = [0.1104− 0.6619i,−0.6677 +
1.2432i, 0.7588 + 0.9201i, 1.0196 + 0.4098i].
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first provide numerical comparison
among the OPA, CPA, and UPA. Based on the comparison we
draw useful insights on the CPA and the impact of transmitter-
side correlation on the secure transmission with AN.
In Fig. 2 we plot the secrecy outage probabilities of the
secure transmission with OPA, CPA, and UPA. Surprisingly,
we first observe that our proposed CPA achieves almost
identical secrecy outage probabilities with the OPA, which
demonstrates that the proposed CPA is nearly optimal in
terms of minimizing the secrecy outage probability under the
adopted specific simulation settings (which are detailed in the
caption of this figure1). Noting Nt = 4 for Fig. 2, we can
conclude that our proposed CPA is nearly optimal even for a
finite number of transmit antennas with moderate correlation.
We note that as we have proved in Theorem 1 the CPA is
optimal in the large system regime with Nt → ∞. In this
figure, we also observe that the proposed CPA achieves much
lower secrecy outage probabilities than the UPA, which shows
one advantage of the CPA relative to the UPA. Finally, we note
that the optimal value of α that minimizes the secrecy outage
probability for the CPA is different from that for the UPA.
In Fig. 3 we plot the minimum secrecy outage probabilities
of the OPA, CPA, and UPA, which are obtained through
setting α as its optimal values that minimizing the secrecy
outage probabilities of the OPA, CPA, and UPA, respectively.
Although our analysis is valid for an arbitrary correlation
matrix, in this figure and the following figure we adopt an
exponential correlation model, in which the (i, j)-th entry of
1As we mentioned in Section II-B, UT does not affect the performance of
the secure transmission with AN. Thus, we only presented the adopted Λ for
this figure.
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Fig. 3. Minimum secrecy outage probabilities of OPA, CPA, and UPA versus
different values of ρr for Nt = 3, L = 0.5m, Rs = 1, γB = 10 dB, γE →
∞, and (a) hs = [−0.1470+0.1876i,−0.3905+1.0675i,−0.5091−0.8150i],
(b) hs = [−0.0845 + 0.5064i, 0.1612 + 0.0330i,−0.7529 + 0.0282i].
T is given by tij = ρ
δij
r , where ρr ∈ [0, 1] is the correlation
parameter specified by system settings (e.g., signal frequency)
and δij is the distance between the i-th and j-th antennas at
Alice. We note that a larger ρr indicates a larger correlation
for a fixed δij , where ρr = 0 serves as the uncorrelated
case and ρr = 1 represents the fully correlated case. We also
adopt the uniform linear array as Alice’s antenna configuration
and the array length is denoted as L in this figure and the
following figures. In Fig. 3 (a) for the specific adopted hs
we observe that all the minimum secrecy outage probabilities
increase as ρr increases. This is due to the fact that as ρr → 1
the null space of the main channel disappears and Alice
cannot create interference to Eve while perfectly avoiding the
interference to Bob. In Fig. 3 (b) for the specific adopted hs we
observe that the minimum secrecy outage probability of the
CPA first decreases and then increases as ρr increases. The
decrease can be explained by the fact that the initial increase
in the correlation (i.e., ρr) offers useful information of the
eavesdropper’s channel while does not significantly affect the
null space of the specific hs, which leads to the reduction
in the secrecy outage probability. The following increase in
the minimum secrecy outage probability of the CPA can be
explained by the fact that the offered information on the
eavesdropper’s channel by the increase in ρr cannot counteract
the decay of the null space caused by the increase in ρr. We
conducted hundreds of simulations for different realizations
of hs and all the results are similar to either Fig. 3 (a) or
Fig. 3 (b). In both Fig. 3 (a) and Fig. 3 (b) we observe that
the CPA outperforms the UPA when ρr is larger than some
specific value, which only corresponds to a small correlation.
As we mentioned in Section II-C, we have focused on
the secrecy outage probability for a given value of CB in
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Fig. 4. Average minimum secrecy outage probabilities of CPA and UPA
versus different values of Nt for L = 0.5m, Rs = 1, γB = 10 dB, and
γE →∞.
order to study the AN power allocation design based on a
given main channel realization. Now, we also present the
secrecy outage probability averaged over all main channel
realizations. In Fig. 4, we plot the average minimum secrecy
outage probabilities of the CPA and UPA (denoted by P c∗so (Rs)
and Pu∗so (Rs), respectively) versus different values of Nt for
fixed array length L, which are obtained through averaging
the minimum secrecy outage probabilities of the CPA and
UPA over h, respectively. In this figure, we first observe that
Pu∗so (Rs) first decreases and then keeps nearly constant as
Nt increases. This indicates that Nt suffers from a saturation
point in improving the secrecy performance of the UPA, which
can be explained by the fact that as Nt increases for a fixed
L the correlation among these transmit antennas becomes
stronger. On the contrary, we observe that P s∗so (Rs) contin-
uously decreases as Nt increases without such a saturation
point. This demonstrates another advantage of our proposed
CPA relative to the UPA, which is that when Nt is large
the CPA outperforms the UPA even in the wiretap channel
with very low transmitter-side correlation. This advantage is
confirmed by the observation that P c∗so (Rs) becomes lower
than Pu∗so (Rs) for ρr = 0.05 when Nt is larger than 21. Also,
this observation can be explained by our Theorem 1, in which
we have proved that the CPA is optimal in the large system-
regime. Finally, we observe that the gap between P c∗so (Rs) and
Pu∗so (Rs) increases as Nt increases. This is caused by the fact
that Pu∗so (Rs) suffers from a saturation point as Nt increases,
but P s∗so (Rs) does not.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we devised the CPA for AN in the wire-
tap channel with transmitter-side correlation and theoretically
proved its optimality in terms of achieving the minimum
secrecy outage probability in the large system regime with
Nt → ∞. Our analysis showed that the proposed CPA
maximizes the average interference to Eve for arbitrary Nt.
The conducted numerical results demonstrated that the CPA
is nearly optimal and significantly outperforms the UPA even
for finite Nt.
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